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Abstract
Receiving timely and relevant security information is crucial
for maintaining a high-security level on an IT infrastructure.
This information can be extracted from Open Source Intelli-
gence published daily by users, security organisations, and
researchers. In particular, Twitter has become an information
hub for obtaining cutting-edge information about many sub-
jects, including cybersecurity. This work proposes SYNAPSE,
a Twitter-based streaming threat monitor that generates a con-
tinuously updated summary of the threat landscape related to
a monitored infrastructure. Its tweet-processing pipeline is
composed of filtering, feature extraction, binary classification,
an innovative clustering strategy, and generation of Indicators
of Compromise (IoCs). A quantitative evaluation considering
all tweets from 80 accounts over more than 8 months (over
195.000 tweets), shows that our approach timely and success-
fully finds the majority of security-related tweets concerning
an example IT infrastructure (true positive rate above 90%),
incorrectly selects a small number of tweets as relevant (false
positive rate under 10%), and summarises the results to very
few IoCs per day. A qualitative evaluation of the IoCs gen-
erated by SYNAPSE demonstrates their relevance (based on
the CVSS score and the availability of patches or exploits),
and timeliness (based on threat disclosure dates from NVD).
1 Introduction
A security analyst must be aware of the latest developments re-
garding updates, patches, mitigation measures, vulnerabilities,
attacks, and exploits to adequately protect an IT infrastructure.
Security Operations Centers (SOC) improve their awareness
through Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
software, thereby allowing the correlation of the latest cyber-
security developments with internal infrastructure events.
There are two primary ways of obtaining cybersecurity
news. One is to purchase a curated feed from a specialised
company such as SenseCy [4] or SurfWatch [14]. Another, is
to collect Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) [43] available
from various sources on the internet (e.g., Threatpost [15]).
There are numerous threat intelligence tools (e.g., Spider-
Foot [13], IntelMQ [7]) that can collect security-related OS-
INT from a wide variety of sources, including such feeds.
However, these use simple keyword-based filters to narrow
the big volume of collected information, not employing any
sophisticated methodology to select only the relevant data or
handling data aggregation and duplicate removal—two fun-
damental characteristics for an efficient OSINT usage [40].
Moreover, recent work (e.g., [29, 37,50]) demonstrates that
different types of useful information and Indicators of Com-
promise (IoC) can be obtained from OSINT through the appli-
cation of machine learning techniques. These results highlight
the gap between the current capabilities of existing OSINT-
processing tools and the intelligence OSINT can provide.
To address this gap, this paper proposes SYNAPSE, a
Twitter-based streaming threat monitor that generates a contin-
uously updated summary of the threat landscape concerning a
monitored infrastructure. SYNAPSE gathers tweets from care-
fully selected security-related accounts, selects those relevant
for the specified monitored infrastructure using supervised
machine learning, and avoids presenting repeated information
by employing a novel stream clustering method.
SYNAPSE’s design addresses three main challenges: OS-
INT collection, cybersecurity-related content selection, and
the aggregation of related tweets through a stream clustering
algorithm adapted to the context of cybersecurity. A threat
intelligence tool must address the first two challenges to en-
sure its usefulness, i.e., it must collect large amounts of data
and accurately select those that are relevant for the SOC. The
aggregation challenge is paramount to promote the efficient
operation of the SOC, i.e., the analysts have a limited time
budget to evaluate the current threat landscape, thus the tool
must present only a summary of the most relevant information.
This summarised view enables prioritising threats that require
exploring additional information such as the tweets’ links.
Twitter was chosen for two main reasons. First, Twitter is
well-recognised as a relevant source of short notices (almost
in real-time) about web activity and occurring events [5].
Previous research shows this is also true for cybersecu-
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rity [19,32,37]. In fact, the most important cybersecurity news
feeds are present in Twitter (e.g., NVD, ExploitDB, CVE, Se-
curity Focus, Nessus), making it a hub for all these sources.
Second, the limited size of a tweet makes it simple to process
through general-purpose machine learning approaches, which
enable low error levels across multiple domains of application.
Furthermore, although short, tweets provide enough elements
to categorise their content, as well as links for more detailed
material.
Most previous work to gather cybersecurity OSINT infor-
mation focuses on the filtering and classification process [27,
31, 33, 34, 37]. Beyond that, few works extract information
from unstructured text (including tweets) [21,29,45,50]. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, no previous work addresses
the timely summarisation of a cyberthreat Twitter stream,
thereby providing an end-to-end approach for monitoring the
current threat landscape.
The standard technique for aggregating related data is
clustering [16]. In a streaming context, a stream cluster-
ing algorithm becomes necessary [42]. Existing algorithms
(e.g., [24,48,49]) have two shortcomings for our context: they
require a priori definition of the target number of clusters and
they discard outliers. However, when processing a cybersecu-
rity news feed, the number of active threats under discussion
is unknown in advance and outliers cannot be discarded as
they are likely to represent new threats.
SYNAPSE adapts a well-known stream clustering algo-
rithm to overcome these limitations, by detecting whether
tweets refer new threats or updates to previously known ones,
thus becoming appropriate for maintaining a continuous up-
to-date summary of current threats observed. Finally, to close
the pipeline from Twitter to the SOC tools, SYNAPSE pro-
duces IoCs from the clustered OSINT, making it integrable
with various SIEMs (e.g., IBM QRadar [6]) and threat intelli-
gence/sharing tools (e.g., MISP [10]).
A quantitative evaluation considering all tweets from 80
accounts over more than 8 months (over 195.000 tweets),
shows that SYNAPSE finds the majority of security-related
tweets concerning an example IT infrastructure (true positive
rate above 90%), incorrectly selects a small number of tweets
as relevant (false positive rate under 10%), and summarises
the results to very few IoCs per day. When compared to a
naive text-filtering approach (as employed by most threat
intelligence systems used in practice), it decreases the number
of tweets presented by approximately 80%, with the number
of summarised IoCs being only 21% of the tweets classified as
relevant. This volume of data can either be inspected manually
or processed by a SIEM as OSINT-generated events. Further,
a qualitative analysis of the largest 65 clusters generated by
SYNAPSE revealed two paramount findings. Firstly, 43%
of the IoCs describe high-impact security alerts (CVSS ≥
7.0), and for half of these, the tweet publication preceded
the vulnerability publication on the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) by eight days (on average). Secondly, 70%
of the analysed clusters provided serviceable intelligence,
including exploits whose vulnerabilities were not matched to
NVD entries. In summary, our contributions are:
1. An end-to-end streaming threat monitor architecture for
collecting, classifying, and clustering tweets related to a
specified infrastructure (Section 3);
2. A novel application strategy and adaptation of well-
known clustering techniques to the context of cyber-
security threat awareness (Section 4);
3. A detailed system evaluation using three real-world
datasets and a qualitative analysis of the security alerts
generated thereof (Section 7);
4. Methods for generating MISP-compatible IoCs from
tweets that enable the integration of SYNAPSE into
SOC operation (Sections 3 and 5).
2 Related Work
In the following, we briefly review the previous work related
to SYNAPSE: processing tweets for cybersecurity, threat in-
telligence tools, and stream clustering algorithms.
Twitter for cybersecurity. Several works aim to find cyber-
security OSINT about a given IT infrastructure. These rely on
a keyword set to govern the selection of tweets, thereby pick-
ing only the potentially relevant content. Mittal et al. [33] use
a knowledge base created from security concepts to evaluate
if a tweet is relevant for cybersecurity. Similarly, Le Sceller
et al. [27] designed a framework that collects tweets on a
keyword basis and is capable of extending the keyword set
automatically. Ritter et al. [34] search Twitter for occurrences
of three specific topics: DoS attacks, data breaches, and ac-
count hijacking. Trabelsi et al. [45] cluster tweets by subject.
Threats not referred by NVD are considered novel and han-
dled like zero-day vulnerabilities. Dionísio et al. [21] used
deep learning techniques to detect and extract security-related
information from tweets. Sabottke et al. [37] show that in-
formation about exploits are published on Twitter two days
before they are included in NVD (on average). None of these
works provide an end-to-end solution for online threat moni-
toring, mainly because they focus on detection, overlooking
summarisation and SOC integration.
Threat Intelligence Tools. Research-oriented work focus
on gathering OSINT and transforming it into machine-
readable IoCs for feeding Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
anti-viruses, or other tools. Mathews et al. [31] employ tradi-
tional (e.g., logs) and non-traditional (e.g., forums, blog posts)
data sources to create an ontology that infers the legitimacy of
traffic flows, feeding an IDS with the results. Liao et al. [29]
developed a framework for extracting IoCs from technical
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Figure 1: SYNAPSE’s architecture. Collected tweets pass through the various stages and those classified as relevant are
aggregated, transformed in IoCs, and delivered to SOC analysts.
literature, enabling high recall of the methodology. In a differ-
ent work, Zhu et al. [50] present a system that processes the
scientific literature studying Android malware and extracts
features describing the attacks to create a malware detector.
The objective of these works is to extract machine-readable
information from OSINT, which is different from our goal.
Besides the research-oriented efforts to include OSINT in
protection systems, off-the-shelf tools are able to collect and
deliver OSINT-based threat intelligence. SpiderFoot [13] is an
OSINT automation tool that uses multiple sources (e.g., Bit-
coin addresses, Twitter) for three main purposes: target recon-
naissance, assess an organisation’s exposure on the Internet,
and OSINT collection for security purposes. IntelMQ [7] is
an open-source system for collecting and processing security-
related OSINT feeds designed for organising data coming
from various sources. It employs an ontology for data har-
monisation and converts all events into a uniform json for-
mat. MISP [10] is a threat intelligence platform designed
for sharing and correlating IoCs. It receives many types of
threat inputs and exports its data into other MISP instances or
threat intelligence tools. Generally speaking, these tools do
not employ any advanced processing capability for filtering
and matching threats, resorting only to keyword-based string
comparisons.
Stream clustering. With the few exceptions discussed bel-
low, most stream clustering algorithms require the target num-
ber of clusters (k) to be defined as a parameter and discard
elements that do not fit the clusters (outliers) [42]. Feng et
al. [22] cluster only the tweets’ hashtags, using text similarity
to adapt the number of clusters to the collected data. However,
this algorithm would potentially miss important information
in the security field, as the clustering would not consider the
full tweet text, only hashtags. Saki et al. [38] use a density-
based clustering approach, therefore avoiding the definition
of k. However, their technique discards outliers, which could
lead to missing important emerging threats. Shou et al. [41]
algorithm allows the value of k to vary up to an upper limit,
but its outlier detection mechanism discards topics that do not
gain traction, ignoring possibly important threats that remain
unknown for long periods of time.
3 SYNAPSE Pipeline
Figure 1 presents SYNAPSE’s architecture and data process-
ing stages—tweet gathering, filtering, feature extraction, clas-
sification, clustering, and IoC generation—described next.
Data Collection. The data collector module requires a set
of accounts, from which it will collect every posted tweet
using Twitter’s stream API—an approach already found in
the literature [39]. These accounts can be from security ana-
lysts and organisations, vendors, hackers, researchers, among
others. They are chosen considering the likelihood of users
tweeting about the security of elements belonging to the moni-
tored IT infrastructure. Since usually security analysts already
follow OSINT sources and Twitter accounts, it is just a matter
of providing these sources to SYNAPSE.
Simply collecting tweets by keywords is a method likely to
retrieve large amounts of irrelevant information. For instance,
tweets with the word “windows” include all Windows-related
topics (the OS) and all tweets referring glass windows. By col-
lecting tweets only from selected security-related accounts, a
more substantial fraction of tweets is related to cybersecurity.
Filtering. Despite the account-based collection approach,
most likely the collected data will include tweets unrelated to
the infrastructure under the analyst’s care. These have to be
dropped by a filter. The filtering approach assumes that a tweet
referring a threat to a particular IT infrastructure asset has
to mention that asset. Therefore, a second input is required:
a set of keywords describing the assets of the monitored IT
infrastructure. Only tweets that include at least one of the
keywords will pass the filter. Keywords further restrict the
scope of the security events, hence decreasing the number of
irrelevant tweets beyond the filter.
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To maximise the effectiveness of SYNAPSE, the keywords
defining the monitored assets must be as complete and specific
as possible. For example, if the analyst is in charge of secur-
ing a Linux cluster running virtual machines to serve a web
service with a database, the keyword set could be {linux,
ssh, virtualbox, vbox, mysql, apache, php}.
Pre-processing and Feature Extraction Pre-processing
normalises the tweet representation. First, all characters are
converted to lower case, and stopwords and hyperlinks are
removed—the latter are shortened URLs that provide little
information. Numbers, dots, and hyphens are replaced by
their textual representation (e.g., “2” to “two”), as these are
relevant to distinguish software versions (e.g., Mozilla Fire-
fox 4.5.1-2). Finally, all non [a-z] characters are removed.
For instance, after pre-processing, the tweet “#Oracle #Linux
6 / 7 : Unbreakable Enterprise kernel (ELSA-2016-3573)
https://t.co/vLTel8NodG” becomes “oracle linux six seven
unbreakable enterprise kernel elsa hyphen two thousand and
sixteen hyphen three thousand five hundred and seventy three”.
The original tweets are stored for presentation.
The tweets must be converted to a numerical format to
become suitable for supervised learning classification tech-
niques. This work uses the well-known Term Frequency -
Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) method [28]. TF-IDF
computes weights to words (features) based on their occur-
rence frequency in each document and on the group of doc-
uments considered. The weight of a word increases with its
frequency of occurrence in a single document but is scaled
down by the frequency of occurrence in all documents. By
mapping each consecutive word token to a corresponding
vector position, tweets are converted to a constant size, zero-
padded, TF-IDF numeric vector. Finally, to limit the size of
the vector we employ the hashing trick technique [46].
Classification. For the classification of tweets according to
their security relevance, two classifiers have been explored:
Support Vector Machines (SVM) [20] and Multi-Layer Per-
ceptron (MLP) Neural Networks (NN) [35, 36]. The SVM is
a broadly-used classifier achieving good results across a mul-
titude of application domains. We consider the SVM imple-
mentation available in the Apache Spark’ Machine Learning
library (MLlib) [2], which employs a linear kernel, thereby
assuming the input vectors are linearly separable.
Since MLlib does not provide a non-linear SVM kernel,
MLlib’s MLP NN implementation was considered to account
for the assumption that input vectors may not be linearly
separable. The MLP is a well-established and frequently used
NN architecture that has a long track record of good and
consistent results over a vast number of classification tasks.
Clustering. SYNAPSE uses clustering to aggregate similar
tweets in the news feed stream. The Clustream algorithm [17]
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Figure 2: Representation of a cluster into the MISP taxon-
omy [11] and an OSINT-generated event in MISP.
was chosen as the basis for this pipeline stage as its structure
and characteristics were closest to our requirements. However,
it required adaptation to SYNAPSE’s context to achieve threat
aggregation as described in the next section.
MISP compatible IoC Generation. After the clustering
phase, the clusters of tweets are transformed into the IoC for-
mat to allow their inclusion in SIEMs or threat intelligence
platforms. There are several standards for sharing IoCs, such
as STIX [8] or MISP [11]. The format must be extensible
and adaptable as tweets are unstructured and contain unpre-
dictable content. For these reasons, the MISP format has been
selected to generate IoCs. Moreover, it can be easily converted
into other standard formats like STIX.
We use a combination of MISP items to generate the IoC.
One MISP Event is composed of two Objects containing se-
curity indicators called Attributes: one describing the content
of the exemplar tweet (the cluster centroid); the other rep-
resenting the cluster of tweets. Events are classified using
tags, added according to a set of threat categories related to
existing taxonomies: ENISA and VERIS for cyberthreats [12].
The OSINT tag is added to emphasise the automatic creation
based on tweets. The classification is achieved by using regu-
lar expressions to match taxonomy elements in the exemplar’s
message, generating one tag for each match.
Figure 2 depicts the taxonomy employed to represent IoCs
in MISP (top of the figure). The exemplar tweet is the core
of the IoC, while its cluster is an extra element to increase in-
formativeness. The bottom of the figure shows a MISP Event
generated from a cluster and its exemplar (the example cluster
shown in Table 1). The OSINT object contains extracted in-
formation from the exemplar such as the tweet’s message, any
links therein, and the Cluster_Analysis object contains the
remainder cluster data. A simple classification was applied:
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Table 1: An example of a cluster and its exemplar (in Bold).
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Web Security Appliance HTTP
POST Denial of Service Vulnerability https://t.co/6FXInr9hNh
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Web Security Appliance HTTP POST
Denial of Service Vulnerability https://t.co/6FXInr9hNh
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Web Security Appliance HTTP Length
Denial of Service Vulnerability https://t.co/TgU0T9vlZt #bugtraq
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Web Security Appliance HTTP POST
Denial of Service Vulnerability https://t.co/feZlTxQKVC #bugtraq
#cybersecurity Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Web Security Appliance
HTTP POST Denial of Service https://t.co/XUUctUnQ8F #infosec
#vulnerability #security : Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Web Security
Appliance HTTP POST Denial of Serv https://t.co/9bW0ls00kx
#internet #security: Cisco Web Security Appliance HTTP POST Denial of Service
Vulnerability https://t.co/cXQUTWUBbD
the OSINT tag marks the event as created from tweets, and
the “Denial of Service” tag (from VERIS) classifies the threat.
4 Tweet stream clustering
Since Twitter users can tweet or retweet about the same sub-
ject, SYNAPSE is expected to collect many similar tweets.
Thus, to cover information about the IT infrastructure, the
analyst would have to manually inspect a large amount of
redundant data for each threat.
To alleviate this burden, clustering is used to group similar
tweets classified as relevant for the protection of the IT infras-
tructure. Ideally, the information collected about a specific
threat gets aggregated in one cluster, from which a single rep-
resentative tweet—the exemplar—is presented to the analyst.
By clustering the stream of relevant tweets, distinct active
threats are summarised in a set of clusters and updated as
more tweets are collected. It is through this mechanism that
SYNAPSE can create an active threat monitor outlining the
current threat landscape, i.e., the current threats that poten-
tially require more immediate attention from SOC analysts.
4.1 Data stream aggregation challenges
Clustering is commonly applied in batch, as an exploratory
data technique where a static data set is clustered into k
groups [16]. The number of clusters, k, is either defined a
priori or estimated to satisfy performance metrics [16]. In
a dynamic setting such as SYNAPSE’s streaming context,
defining k beforehand is not possible, as the number of threats
being discussed at a given time is unknown. If at any moment
SYNAPSE was processing t threats and clustering was set to
find k 6= t clusters, the result would contain clusters including
unrelated threats, various clusters related to the same threat,
or both cases. Therefore, SYNAPSE requires a clustering al-
gorithm able to adapt k over time.
Furthermore, an essential feature of most stream clustering
algorithms is the ability to detect and remove outliers that may
disrupt the quality of the clustering. In the security context,
performing outlier removal could prevent the discovery of
emerging threats. Moreover, all tweets reaching SYNAPSE’s
clustering stage were classified as relevant, and should not be
discarded. Therefore, SYNAPSE requires a clustering algo-
rithm capable of maintaining performance indicators (e.g.,
intra and inter-cluster cohesion) without removing outliers.
4.2 DynamicClustream
The lack of solutions that fit the requirements of threat in-
telligence tools (see Section 2), motivated us to adapt the
Clustream [17] algorithm for SYNAPSE, thus creating the
DynamicClustream. The Clustream algorithm clusters a data
stream in two phases. The online phase performs a simple
and efficient clustering of the inbound stream by keeping only
a summary of the data collected, thus abiding to the speed
requirements of a data stream [16]. The offline phase is per-
formed in background to provide a more complete analysis of
the collected data through a more effective and computation-
ally demanding clustering algorithm. Clustream includes an
outlier detection mechanism that excludes data points unfit
for any of the existing clusters by analysing the distance from
that point to all clusters. A decision is only taken once it be-
comes clear if a data point is an element of a new trend or an
isolated occurrence. The components that distinguish Dynam-
icClustream from Clustream are detailed in the following.
High-level Overview. Assume there is always a global clus-
ter state S, defined as a set of sets, describing the clusters
formed from a previously processed time-window of tweets.
When a new tweet t is received, the online clustering com-
ponent attempts to place t in one of S’s clusters. If a direct
placement is not possible, the offline clustering component
is triggered to compute a new clean cluster state considering
the tweets in the clusters of S plus t.
Once a new cluster state S is in place, a final step is taken
to obtain each cluster’s exemplar tweet, i.e., the tweet rep-
resenting the cluster, that will be shown to the analyst. The
exemplar tweet is selected by choosing the tweet with the
smallest Euclidean distance to the centroid of the cluster. An
example of a generated cluster (and its exemplar) appears in
Table 1. The online and offline components of DynamicClus-
tream are presented in Algorithm 1, with locking details for
ensuring atomic updates on S omitted for better readability.
Online clustering component. The online clustering com-
ponent uses a lightweight approach to assign a new tweet t to
the current clustering state S. To do so, the membership of t is
tested in all clusters (line 3) by employing the WTS cohesion
measure (introduced below). This is done by adding t to each
cluster Ci ∈ S and calculating the corresponding WTS value.
t belongs to Ci when WTS is above a certain threshold τ. If
t does not fit in one of the existing clusters, a new cluster
solely containing t is created (lines 4–5). If t belongs to a sin-
gle cluster, it is added to that cluster (lines 6–7). When t fits
more than one cluster, it is added (temporarily) to the cluster
5
Algorithm 1: DynamicClustream online and offline clus-
tering.
1 S← /0 // global cluster state
2 Function OnlineClustering(t):
3 i← GetNumHits(S, t)
4 if i = 0 then
5 AddNewCluster(S, t)
6 else if i = 1 then
7 UpdateCluster(S, t)
8 else // needs offline clustering
9 PlaceInClosestCluster(S, t)
10 schedule OfflineClustering(S)
11 Function OfflineClustering(SavedState):
12 T← Flatten(SavedState)
13 ε∗←+∞; k← 2; Clusters← /0
14 S∗← /0
15 while T 6= /0 do
16 do
17 Clusters,ε← KMeansClustering(T,k)
18 if ε< ε∗ then
19 ε∗← ε
20 k← k+1
21 while ε= ε∗ and k < |T|
22 forall C ∈Clusters do
23 if WTS(C)≥ τ then
24 S∗← S∗ ∪{C}
25 T← T \C
26 S←MergeClusterState(S∗,Flatten(S)\Flatten(S∗))
with the highest membership rate, and the offline clustering
is scheduled (lines 9–10).
In SYNAPSE’s application scenario it makes no sense to
remove outliers. Instead, when new tweets do not belong to S,
we treat them as the onset of a threat by adding new clusters
with a single element which in time may receive additional
tweets. This outlier processing mechanism allows adapting
the number of clusters, k, to the novelty in the dataflow. Fur-
thermore, it is through the online component of Dynamic-
Clustream that the active threat monitor is implemented: the
system categorises new tweets as new threats or as updates
to known ones, thus maintaining an updated threat summary
about an IT infrastructure.
Cohesion Measure. Cluster cohesion and cluster separa-
tion are concepts used to assess the validity of a partition
generated by a clustering algorithm [18], which in most cases
have a purely geometric interpretation. In SYNAPSE, cohe-
sion is based on the similarity of tweets within a cluster and
not on a geometric measure such as the distance to the clus-
ter centroid, thus defining a context-based cluster validation
approach, argued to be more effective [25].
To reinforce the one-to-one relation between clusters and
threats, the cohesion measure must detect clusters whose
tweets refer to the same threat. Assuming that a threat is
expressed by a minimum number of words appearing in
all tweets, the proposed cohesion measure—named Within-
cluster Threat Similarity (WTS)—is defined as ωwm , where ω
is the number of words shared by all the cluster’s tweets and
wm is the number of words of the smallest tweet in the cluster.
WTS is 0 if no words are shared by the tweets of a cluster, and
1 when all tweets share the words of the smallest tweet in the
cluster. It assumes that if all cluster tweets share a sufficiently
large number of words, then they mention the same threat.
The degree of separation of two clusters Ci and C j is mea-
sured by the Jaccard index [47]. It is determined as J = |Ci∩C j ||Ci∪C j | ,
corresponding to the ratio between the number of common
words to Ci and C j and the number of unique words of Ci and
C j. The lower its value, the more separated the clusters are.
Offline clustering component. The offline component ap-
plies the k-means clustering algorithm [30] repeatedly to pro-
vide more robust clusters. k-means is a widely used algorithm
that has provided good efficiency and empirical success over
the last 50 years [26]. However, it is commonly employed for
exploratory data analysis, not for automatic text summarisa-
tion.
The k-means algorithm requires the specification of the
number of clusters, k, which is unknown in this case. At a
given time we do not know how many potential threats to our
infrastructure are being discussed. Therefore, we defined a
novel strategy to find the so-called elbow point [44], i.e., the
point beyond which by increasing k there is no significant
improvement in the clusters’ Sum of Squared Errors (SSE).
This procedure automatically determines k, thus avoiding the
specification of a threshold to find the elbow point or the
visual inspection of the within-class-variance versus k graph.
k-means application strategy: Starting at k1 = 2, a k-means
model is trained for each successive ki = i + 1 number of
clusters, which produces a corresponding SSE, denoted by εi.
As the initial cluster centres are randomly chosen, there is a
given variance σi associated to εi. As we keep increasing ki,
we expect εi to decrease up to the point where the magnitudes
of εi and σi become of the same order. At this point εi+1− εi
might become zero or even negative, indicating that there is
no significant SSE improvement in increasing ki. Therefore,
the iteration is stopped when the error (ε) stops decreasing or
(the limit case where) the number of clusters corresponds to
the number of tweets to be clustered, and ki is selected as the
number of clusters (lines 16–21).
By testing this approach, we found that small clusters had
only very similar tweets, but other large clusters contained
unrelated tweets. The cause might be two-fold: (1) k-means
assumes spherical clusters that it tends to produce equally
sized, which might not be adequate; and (2) the strategy to
find k is not guaranteed to find the best k. To overcome this
limitation, we use the WTS cohesion measure to quantify
how closely related the tweets in a cluster are, and implement
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a re-clustering method that splits these clusters into smaller
ones with related tweets. If WTS ≥ τ (a specified threshold),
indicating high cohesion, it enables the validation of clusters
as final.
Re-clustering method: All tweets of non-final clusters are
gathered (line 22–25) and re-clustered (lines 16–21) using
k-means to allow similar tweets to be grouped. Then, the new
clusters generated are again tested using their WTS, and the
process is repeated for the non-final clusters. Eventually, all
clusters are considered final, ideally each related to a single
threat, and S∗ is merged with S (line 26), i.e., S∗ is updated
with the tweets received since the algorithm started by exe-
cuting a procedure similar to lines 3–10.
Offline clustering scheduling: At any time, there may be
only one instance of the offline component in execution. Since
multiple tweets received in a short time interval may trigger
offline clustering, we employ the schedule keyword (line 10)
to avoid overlapping executions. The idea is that each call to
schedule OfflineClustering() notifies the system that offline
clustering is required after this point, and saves the current
cluster state for its next execution. Once the algorithm is
started again (using the latest saved state), it process all tweets
pending in S (line 12).
Time-window model. To fully adapt Clustream to our con-
text we also changed the clustering ageing model used to
remove clusters. This model is necessary to complete the
adaptation of the cluster state to the data stream flow.
Clustream’s window model is global in the sense that all
data points are aged and removed using the same rule. How-
ever, this methodology does not fit SYNAPSE application
domain, as different cybersecurity topics have different life-
times. For example, news about an update are expected to
last a few days, while advances about an active threat may
continue for a month or more. Thus, in the cybersecurity
field it makes more sense to adopt a local window model,
monitoring ageing by cluster (by threat). As a consequence,
whole clusters rather than single points should be removed in
forthcoming clustering states.
In DynamicClustream a cluster Ci is removed from the clus-
ter state S if it has been stale for a period of time longer than
θ, i.e., if θ time passes without Ci receiving a new data point.
In this way, topics that no longer receive traction are stowed
away, while active topics retain all their elements, regardless
of the time passed, which may be crucial for understanding
the evolution of a threat.
5 SOC integration
An essential aspect of threat intelligence tools such as
SYNAPSE is the integration in a SOC. In the following, we
describe practical issues related to this integration.
Twitter as OSINT. When using Twitter as a cybersecurity
information source, it is important to consider what would
happen if some of the monitored accounts fell under the con-
trol of the adversary. In a nutshell, two things can happen [37]:
(1) the adversary may not tweet about the threats he is inter-
ested in exploiting using the accounts he controls; or (2) the
adversary may create tweets with false threats, to make SOC
analysts waste their time in solving potential non-existent
problems. Both attacks should not be a significant problem
as long as the amount of accounts controlled by the adver-
sary is relatively small, and the analysts take into account the
reputation of the accounts monitored by the system.
Training the system. Our approach requires the creation
of labelled datasets for training the classifiers. To do that, the
SOC analysts need first to configure the keywords defining
the infrastructure. A second configuration step is to define the
Twitter accounts that will be monitored.
After those two steps, the system should present all filtered
tweets as if they are important, and a button for the analyst to
mark a tweet as “irrelevant”.1 Notice that, to avoid bias, it is
relevant to inform the analysts that the system is under train-
ing. When enough positively-labelled tweets are collected,
the classifiers can be trained in background and then placed
in operation.
It is expected that the classifier’s performance decreases
with time, as the operational data gets progressively different
from the training data. To maintain the utility of the classifiers
in use, it is essential to minimise this effect. Incremental
learning is a technique that can be used for this purpose,
where the classifier’s model is continuously trained with new
labelled examples [23]. By training the model with the latest
events, it is continuously adapted to changes in input format
(in this case, changes in tweet format or language).
Another possibility is to replace the model with a new
model trained with only the latest data, e.g., the last three
months of tweets. This way the model is periodically adapted
to the current threat landscape, so that old data will not impact
the classifier’s quality.
Changing keywords and monitored accounts. Adding or
removing keywords from the datasets require retraining the
classifier. Removing a keyword requires removing the tweets
that were filtered by this keyword and retrain the model with-
out them. To add a keyword, one needs first to complement
the existing labelled dataset (in the same way as described be-
fore) with tweets related to the new keyword, and then retrain
the model with the reformulated data set. Changing the set
of monitored Twitter accounts is not a burden for the system
since the structure of threat descriptions is expected to be
1The “irrelevant” button must always be available, even when the system
is not being trained, in order to collect wrongly classified tweets for future
retraining.
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Table 2: The hypothetical infrastructure designed for tweet
collection and filtering.
oracle, cisco, internet explorer, google chrome, chrome, firefox, microsoft
edge, edge, wordpress, joomla, wp, microsoft windows, ms, linux, operating
system, operating systems
Table 3: Datasets collection and labeling details.
Dataset: D1 D2 D3
Time period 01/11/2015 01/04/2016 15/05/2016
(from/to) 01/04/2016 15/05/2016 10/07/2016
Account sets S1 S1, S2
Total tweets collected 71024 57579 66608
Class distribution Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg.1697 2008 536 4292 1680 2153
similar across all security accounts. The datasets employed in
our experimental evaluation consider this possibility.
6 Experimental Setup
This section describes the experimental work carried out to
validate SYNAPSE. All code is written in Scala and deployed
on the Apache Spark Framework [2]. We chose Spark as its
data-structures are scalable and designed for large datasets.
Also, Spark includes a scalable machine learning library
called MLlib, used to implement all ML algorithms employed
in this paper.
Infrastructure Definition. We used a hypothetical IT in-
frastructure to set SYNAPSE’s filter during its experimental
evaluation. This infrastructure (presented in Table 2) is com-
posed of software elements typically found in the IT world,
such as the most common browsers and operating systems.
Tweet Collection and Labelling. We collected three
datasets during three periods of time. Table 3 presents their
collection periods, the sets of accounts used, and the num-
ber of tweets. After being collected and filtered using the
keywords in Table 2, each tweet was manually labelled as
positive (the tweet mentions a threat to a given part of the
IT infrastructure) or negative, thus creating labelled datasets
suitable for supervised learning.
Two sets of accounts, S1 and S2, were used for tweet col-
lection, as shown in the third row of Table 3. The accounts
are listed in Table 4.
Classifier Configuration. Supervised machine learning
techniques require design tailored to the problem at hand. For
each classifier employed, their relevant parameters and design
variables were varied, namely the step size and the regularisa-
tion parameter (C) for the SVM, and the number of layers and
neurons per layer for the MLP. The size of the TF-IDF feature
vector considered was also varied for both classifiers. Through
a Pareto-optimal search, ideal configurations were found: the
Table 4: Sets of accounts used to create the datasets.
S1 Accounts: inj3ct0r, TrustedSec, Anomali, briankrebs, Secunia, exploitdb,
alienvault, slashdot, dstrom, Info_Sec_Buzz, vuln_lab, threatintel, dangoodin001,
ivspiridonov, ThreatFeed, pikisec, SANSInstitute, johullrich, drericcole,
F1r3h4nd, MaldicoreAlerts, USCERT_gov, gcluley, hal_pomeran, Security-
Week, SecurityNewsbot, sans_isc, e_kaspersky
S2 Accounts: TenableSecurity, securitywatch, securityaffairs, zer0element,
notsosecure, CyberExaminer, SCMagazine, DMBisson, lennyzeltser,
IT_securitynews, teamcymru, WordPress, MicrosoftEdge, JoomlaTips, sjzaib, Se-
curityMagnate, Cisco, Dell, linuxtoday, securityninja, cyberopsy, OWASP_Java,
_WPScan_, d_plusk, threatpost, Rootsector, Microsoft, linuxfoundation, Chi-
doDike, Sec_Cyber, ptracesecurity, msftsecurity, LinuxSec, hack3rsca, CiscoSe-
curity, NytroRST, joomla, Windows, crackerhacker00, fstenv, HPE_Security,
googlechrome, wordpressdotcom, packet_storm, RokaSecurity, Oracle, firefox,
wpbeginner, YoKoAcc, SecurityCrap, jasonlam_sec, threatmeter
Table 5: The words used in the Logstash filter.
access, acl, admin, advisory, allow, arbitrary, aslr, assurance, attack, auth, buffer,
bug, bypass, certificate, code, command, corruption, csrf, cve, cyber, denial, de-
ployment, dereference, disclosure, execute, exploit, hack, heap, identity, injec-
tion, interception, leak, overflow, privilege, remote, root, scripting, security, stack,
threat, unauthenticated, vuln, xss
best SVM uses a step size and C of 0.05 and 5, respectively,
and the best MLP had 5 layers with 10 neurons each. Both
models use feature vectors with a size of 3000, revealing a
clear advantage in using high-dimensional feature vectors. A
complete description of the methodology employed for the
classifier’s design can be found in Appendix A.
Clustering. SYNAPSE uses the k-means algorithm in the
offline clustering component, configured with fifty iterations,
a minimum of two clusters, and the remaining parameters
with their default values. Clustering was performed on the set
of tweets classified as positive.
The WTS cluster cohesion measure was set to τ= 23 . This
value was selected after preliminary experiments, reflecting
the rationale that two tweets can be in the same cluster if and
only if they share at least two-thirds of their words.
We compare our data presentation strategy with the one
employed by threat intelligence tools and SIEMs capable of
collecting OSINT (e.g., AlienVault OTX [1], Spiderfoot [13]).
For that, we set up a Logstash [9] instance fed by the same
dataset as SYNAPSE, which selected as relevant tweets men-
tioning at least one of our infrastructure assets and containing
at least one security concept.
The security concept keywords were selected using the fol-
lowing methodology. First, a list of documents is obtained by
selecting all tweets labelled as positive from all datasets. After
that, we removed stopwords, applied the TF-IDF method, and
selected the words with TF-IDF value lower than a threshold
ρ. Finally, the list was manually filtered for security-irrelevant
content (such as numbers). We considered ρ values of 0.1,
0.2, and 0.3. After inspecting the results, ρ= 0.2 was chosen
due to the provision of the most substantial amount of generic
words without showing words related to a specific context.
The Logstash security concept keyword set corresponding to
ρ= 0.2 appears in Table 5.
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For the time-window model we applied a θ value of seven
days, i.e., a cluster without updates for seven days is removed
from the online clustering state. The same θ value was applied
to the Logstash approach but globally, i.e., all relevant tweets
were removed from the active threat pool after a week.
7 Results
The tweet processing pipeline components were evaluated
using the selected models and datasets D2 and D3. These
consider only tweets in the future of those in the training set
(D1), and include information posted by an additional and
substantially larger set of accounts (S2) not considered in the
training stage. This methodology embodies the idea that in a
real deployment, models will classify future tweets possibly
from a different set of accounts.
Considering that 10-fold cross-validation was employed
during the model selection phase, it should be noted that the
selected model configurations were trained for the evaluation
phase using the whole D1 dataset. The feature vectors of
D2 and D3 tweets were generated using the TF-IDF model
determined using dataset D1. This guarantees that TF-IDF
weights attributed to words in D2 and D3 will be coherent with
those used to train the classifiers.
7.1 Classification
Figure 3 shows the True Positive Rate (TPR) and True Nega-
tive Rate (TNR) of the SVM and MLP classifiers described in
Section 6, considering also the average result of the 10-fold
cross-validation over D1.
Overall, the results are slightly worse for D2 and D3 when
compared to D1 (as expected), since new data presents un-
modeled patterns to the classifiers. Focusing on the results
obtained for D2 and D3, in general, the classifiers maintain
very high TPR and TNR, except for the MLP TPR. In both
cases, the TNR is higher than the TPR. The imbalance be-
tween positively and negatively labelled data in the training
data sets (more negative samples) can explain a higher TNR.
In summary, the SVM approach achieved the best results,
displaying true positive and true negative rates around 90%
and showing a small degradation of results in D2 and D3. For
these reasons, the SVM model was employed in all further
experiments. These results support the application of a super-
vised classifier to select tweets relevant for cybersecurity.
7.2 Clustering
The following experiments evaluate SYNAPSE’s ability to
aggregate the dataflow into meaningful clusters, where each
cluster is expected to describe a single threat. Further, the
DynamicClustream’s window model is evaluated to assess its
capability to detect the continuous discussion of threats.
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Figure 3: SVM (left) and MLP (right) classifier results.
The initial clustering evaluation focuses on the basic algo-
rithm’s capability of properly aggregate tweets, i.e., producing
clusters with high internal cohesion and low inter-cluster sim-
ilarity. Then we analyse the end-to-end benefit of SYNAPSE
and discuss the effectiveness of the proposed outlier detection
mechanism and time-window model which convey the active
threat monitor functionality to SYNAPSE.
Datasets D2 and D3 were merged and fed to SYNAPSE.
At the end of each day, for all clusters in the current cluster
state, we calculated the average WTS and the Jaccard distance
between all pairs of clusters. For the latter, we saved the
largest value, which corresponds to the most similar cluster
pair. Since SYNAPSE’s objective is to obtain distinct clusters,
each devoted to a single threat, the WTS should always be
high (i.e., the elements in each cluster are very similar), and
the maximum Jaccard distance should be low (i.e., there are
no clusters that should be merged).
Figure 4 shows the WTS and maximum Jaccard distance
obtained, comparing the proposed DynamicClustream cluster-
ing algorithm (DC-WTS and DC-J) to its execution in cluster-
ing only mode, without considering re-clustering (NR-WTS
and NR-J). The importance of including the re-clustering step
(lines 22-25 of Algorithm 1) is clear since it raises the WTS to
above 90% independently of the number of clusters and tweets
present in the cluster state. The Jaccard distance, although
with small values, is higher when using the re-clustering al-
gorithm. Yet, this is an expected result. First, re-clustering
produces significantly more clusters, therefore naturally de-
creasing their degree of separation. Second, since tweets in
clusters mentioning different threats are likely to share com-
monly used security concept words and sentence structure,
their similarity is increased.
Regarding the number of clusters obtained using either
approach, the re-clustering algorithm naturally increases the
number of clusters, as shown in Figure 5. Nevertheless, we
argue that in practice, the DynamicClustream algorithm im-
proves the balance between maximising the relevance of the
information presented and minimising the time required for
its analysis. The WTS results provide guarantees that each
cluster has similar tweets, likely about a single threat. There-
fore, we can be confident that the set of cluster exemplar
tweets provides a complete and accurate summary of the cur-
rent threat landscape, thus not requiring additional time to
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tream algorithm with and without the re-clustering step.
analyse more tweets. Without the WTS cohesion validation,
each cluster may discuss various threats—a highly plausible
assumption based on the very low WTS values in Figure 4 for
the NR-WTS case—meaning that all tweets of each cluster
would have to be analysed.
End-to-end Benefit. The results presented in Figure 6 high-
light the end-to-end benefit of using SYNAPSE, and rein-
forces the importance of its clustering stage. The figure shows
the reduction in the number of tweets that have to be analysed,
when compared to the tweet stream, to the classifier output
and to the naive Logstash filter described in Section 6.
The results show the need for efficient OSINT retrieval
tools. Even with the naive keyword-based approach provided
by the Logstash filter, the number of tweets marked as rele-
vant would be extremely high, rendering the approach useless
to SOC analysts. The introduction of a trained classifier de-
creases the amount of information by 65%. By attaching
a clustering stage, we further reduce the information to be
shown by almost 80%, which is a significant improvement.
Active Threat Monitor. To demonstrate the necessity of
the active threat monitor implemented by the proposed stream
clustering algorithm, we measured the active time for each
of the 820 clusters formed during SYNAPSE’s operation
on the union of datasets D2 and D3. We define the duration
of a cluster as the difference in days between the date of
its creation and the date of the last added tweet. Figure 7
depicts the distribution of the number of clusters over the
cluster duration in days. The results clearly show that a global
time-window model enforcing a fixed duration for each tweet
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Figure 7: The distribution of the number of clusters over the
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would fail to detect active topics through time, since the threat
discussion duration varies greatly (between 1 and 57 days),
even in a dataset that covers only 100 days.
7.3 Analysis of Generated IoCs
Besides the ability to accurately select and aggregate tweets
relevant to the security of an IT infrastructure, SYNAPSE pro-
vides useful threat intelligence for SOC analysts. To demon-
strate this, we present some information about the timeliness,
actionability, and relevance of the IoCs generated from the
dataset used in previous experiments.
From the data collected over 3 months, SYNAPSE gener-
ated 820 clusters (IoCs) containing 1754 tweets. From these,
we selected those with 5 or more tweets for analysis, obtaining
65 clusters comprising 466 tweets. These clusters are listed
in Appendix B. The remaining 755 clusters have 1 (577 clus-
ters), 2 (101), 3 (55), and 4 tweets (22). Our focus on larger
clusters was motivated by the expectation that relevant threats
are probably those that attract more attention and, ultimately,
are mentioned in more tweets.
All tweets within each cluster were manually analysed.
From these, as well as from any hyperlink therein, we ex-
tracted all CVEs mentioned (if any) and their Common Vul-
nerability Scoring System v3.0 (CVSS) [3] impact score, the
types of actions that can be performed to respond to the alarm,
and a comparison between the date of the earliest tweet in the
cluster and the CVE’s publication date on NVD.
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Table 6: Examples of tweets whose content has high impact or important actionability.
Cluster exemplar text (without links) # Asset Date Action Threat type Notes
#ubuntu #security : USN-3006-1: Linux kernel vulnerabilities 19 Linux 10/06 Patch vulnerabilities Several vulnerabilities patched, some were not yet included on
NVD, half with CVSS ≥ 7.0
High - USN-3016-1 - Linux kernel vulnerabilities A security
issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivat
12 Linux 27/06 Patch vulnerabilities Several vulnerabilities patched, some were not yet included on
NVD, half with CVSS ≥ 7.5
Microsoft Internet Explorer CVE-2016-3205 Scripting Engine
Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability Type: Vulnerabil
8 IE 14/06
(1)
Config vulnerability,
remote
This cluster contains various threats with CVSS ≥ 7.5; configu-
rations are suggested to mend the issue before it is patched
#CISCO fixed severe #vulnerabilities in Network Management
and #Security Products #SecurityAffairs
9 Cisco 30/06
(2)
Patch vulnerabilities Patch for critical vulnerabilities (CVSS ≥ 8.6) announced on
Twitter before being published on NVD
Bugtraq: [security bulletin] - Linux Kernel Flaw, ASN.1 DER
decoder for x509 certificate DER
6 Linux 06/06
(21)
Patch certificate A highly important Linux kernel flaw (CVSS 7.8) was disclosed
21 days before being included in NVD
Vuln: Oracle Java SE and JRockit CVE-2016-3427 Remote Se-
curity Vulnerability Vulnerable:Red Hat Enterprise Linux
21 Oracle 05/07 Patch vulnerability,
remote
This cluster contains three different threats (one with CVSS 9.0);
patches are available
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco RV110W, RV130W,
and RV215W Routers Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
5 Cisco 15/06
(3)
Patch vulnerability,
execution
A critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) was disclosed and patched
before its inclusion on NVD
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Products IPv6 Neigh-
bor Discovery Crafted Packet Denial of Service
5 Cisco 25/05
(4)
Patch denial of
service
A high impact vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) was disclosed and
patched before its inclusion on NVD
#ubuntu #security : USN-2975-2: Linux kernel (Trusty HWE)
vulnerability
5 Linux 16/05
(42)
Patch vulnerability A high impact vulnerability (CVSS 7.8) was disclosed and
patched before its inclusion on NVD (42 days in advance)
Bugtraq: Wordpress Levo-Slideshow 2.3 - Arbitrary File Up-
load Vulnerability
9 WPress 07/06 Config vulnerability An exploit is provided; a software correction is suggested
The actionability information was divided into three cate-
gories: a patch is available (45 occurrences); a configuration
to avoid the vulnerability exploitation is suggested (2 occur-
rences); and no directly actionable information is provided
(14 occurrences). The latter is mostly associated with clus-
ters mentioning exploits to vulnerabilities, with the tweet
hyperlinks leading to proofs-of-concept. However, an expert
might still make use of this information to prevent exploita-
tion, as discussed in previous work [37]. Patches are mostly
announced together with their associated vulnerabilities, re-
gardless of indexing on NVD. In the end, 71% (46) of the
clusters provided directly usable intelligence, including ex-
ploits whose vulnerabilities were not matched to NVD entries.
Among the 65 clusters, 36 mentioned a total of 122 differ-
ent CVEs (15 clusters mentioning more than one CVE). Of
these, only two have low impact score, about a quarter have
medium impact (33), more than half are categorised with high
impact (68), and more than a tenth have critical impact (14).
Considering their relevance, 43% (28) of the IoCs were
related to CVSS scores above or equal to 7 (high severity)
and 12% (8) to scores above or equal to 9 (critical severity).
Regarding timeliness, 20% of the alerts were raised 8 days
(on average) before their corresponding vulnerabilities were
published on NVD.
As an illustration of the richness of the obtained data, Ta-
ble 6 shows 10 representative IoCs selected from those anal-
ysed. In the table, the date column shows the date of the earli-
est tweet in the cluster and, when a number is shown within
parenthesis, it denotes the number of days before publication
on NVD. Two additional columns provide information about
the threat type (as automatically classified by SYNAPSE) and
relevant notes about the cluster content.
From the 10 clusters presented, 6 announce vulnerabilities
before publication on NVD, all of them with patches avail-
able. Further, 7 are classified with a high CVSS and two with
critical impact. For example, the 7th IoC of the table shows
a critical Cisco router vulnerability patched and published
three days before its inclusion on NVD. Finally, since not all
occurrences are patched at disclosure time, some actionable
IoCs contain suggested configurations to avoid exploitations.
As an example, the last row in the table shows a WordPress
exploit with suggested remediations.
These results show the edge obtained by using Twitter
as a security data source. A SOC analyst using SYNAPSE
would obtain timely and relevant data about patches to known
vulnerabilities, thus possibly reducing the vulnerable system’s
exposure time. Further, the results also show that vendors
publish important impact data before it is included in NVD.
8 Conclusions
This paper proposes SYNAPSE, a Twitter-based streaming
threat monitor for threat detection in security operation cen-
tres. It implements a pipeline that gathers tweets from a set of
accounts, filters them based on the monitored infrastructure,
and classify the remaining tweets as either relevant or not. Rel-
evant tweets are grouped in dynamic clusters and presented
as indicators of compromise that can be either manually in-
spected or fed to SIEMs and other threat intelligence tools.
Results show that our system maximises the relevant infor-
mation (true positive rate of 90%), minimises irrelevant in-
formation (false positive rate of 10%), and aggregates related
information (only 21% of the relevant tweets are presented).
Finally, we performed an evaluation of the IoCs generated by
SYNAPSE, showing that highly relevant, timely and action-
able information was collected, illustrating the value of our
end-to-end approach.
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A Pareto figures
Feature extraction. We used Spark’s implementation of
TF-IDF with default parameters, except for the feature vec-
tor size. In order to find a suitable vector size to de-
scribe the tweets, eleven values were tested: {30,50,80,
100,200,300,500,750,1000,1500,3000}. This range covers
from low to high dimensional vectors, and with it, we should
be able to find an appropriate vector size for the datasets.
Classification. As mentioned in Section 3, two classi-
fiers were employed: a linear SVM and an MLP Neu-
ral Network. Relevant hyper-parameters and design vari-
ables were varied to find a good design for this applica-
tion. For the SVM, we varied C (the regularization parame-
ter) within {0.01,0.02,0.05, 0.1,0.2,0.5,1,2,5}, and the step
size (a parameter for the Stochastic Gradient Descent) within
{0.1,0.5,1,1.5,2,5}. For the MLP, the number of layers var-
ied from 2 to 8 and the number of neurons per layer within
{5,7,10,12,14,16,18,20}.
Each model was evaluated through a 10-fold cross-
validation procedure using dataset D1. The maximum number
of training iterations was set to 100 for the SVM and 200 for
the MLP, which were deemed to achieve parameter conver-
gence for the range of the design parameters.
To select the best classifiers, we performed a Pareto-optimal
search. For each type of classifier we plotted a Pareto front
figure (Figure 8), with lines connecting the dominant configu-
rations regarding True Positive Rate (TPR, x-axis) and True
Negative Rate (TNR, y-axis). Each point shows the average
value obtained by a specific configuration over the 10-fold
cross-validation procedure. The highlighted triangular and
circular points are, respectively, the dominant configurations
and the configurations chosen to be used (the SVM case) in
the experiments. We use the classical true positive definition:
a sample labelled as positive and classified as positive; in our
case, a tweet manually labelled as relevant and classified as
relevant. The negative samples use the equivalent definition.
Based on this analysis we select the configurations with
the best TPR×TNR balance: those with the smallest distance
to the optimum. The best SVM configuration uses a step size
and C values of 0.05 and 5, respectively, and the best MLP
had 5 layers with 10 neurons each. Both models use feature
vectors with a size of 3000, revealing a clear advantage in
using high-dimensional feature vectors.
B Complete Cluster Data
Tables 7 and 8 present the 65 IoCs largest clusters generated
by SYNAPSE, as described in Section 7.2.
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Figure 8: The Pareto fronts for SVM and MLP cross-validated
using D1.
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Figure 9: Number of IoCs for each asset.
By running SYNAPSE’s IoC generation module, each clus-
ter was tagged with the type of threats mentioned by its tweets.
The most common tags are “vulnerability” (23) and “vulnera-
bilities” (13), reflecting that most threats are related to vulner-
ability disclosure. Other two common tags are “exploit” (18)
and “0day” (15) (or “zero-day”), which indicate exploitable
vulnerabilities. Less used tags include “remote” (6) (remote
execution attacks), “denial of service” (6), “SQL injection”
(5), and “Buffer overflow” (4) (or BO).
Out of the 13 assets composing the hypothetical IT infras-
tructure described in Table 2, only 9 (∼ 70%) had related
IoCs. The distribution of IoCs over the assets is shown in
Figure 9. WordPress is the asset with more related IoCs (19),
followed by Linux (14) and Cisco (12). All analysed IoCs
mentioned a single asset.
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Table 7: Largest generated clusters represented as IoCs.
Cluster exemplar text (without links) # Asset Date Action Threat type Notes
Vuln: Oracle Java SE and JRockit CVE-2016-3427 Remote Se-
curity Vulnerability Vulnerable:Red Hat Enterprise Linux
21 Oracle 05/07 Patch vulnerability, remote This cluster contains three different threats (one
with CVSS 9.0); patches are available
#ubuntu #security : USN-3006-1: Linux kernel vulnerabilities 19 Linux 10/06 Patch vulnerabilities Several vulnerabilities patched, some were not
yet included on NVD, half with CVSS ≥ 7.0
#0daytoday #Cisco EPC 3928 - Multiple Vulnerabilities [we-
bapps #exploits #Vulnerabilities #0day #Exploit]
16 Cisco 07/06 None exploit, vulnerabilities, 0day An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection (half of the vulns with CVSS
≥ 7.5)
#0daytoday #Joomla En Masse com_enmasse Component 5.1 -
6.4 - SQL Injection Vulnerability [#0day #Exploit]
12 Joomla 15/06 None SQL injection, exploit,
injection, vulnerability, 0day
An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
High - USN-3016-1 - Linux kernel vulnerabilities A security
issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivat
12 Linux 27/06 Patch vulnerabilities Several vulnerabilities patched, some were not
yet included on NVD, half with CVSS ≥ 7.5
#0daytoday #Sun Secure Global Desktop and Oracle Global
Desktop 4.61.915 - ShellShock Exploit [#0day #Exploit]
11 Oracle 06/06 None exploit, 0day An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
#ubuntu #security : USN-2993-1: Firefox vulnerabilities 10 Firefox 09/06
(4)
Patch vulnerabilities Patches are available for vulnerabilities, half
with CVSS ≥ 8.8
Bugtraq: CM Ad Changer 1.7.7 Wordpress Plugin - Cross Site
Scripting Web Vulnerability
10 WPress 13/06 Patch vulnerability A patch is available; an exploit is provided
Bugtraq: Wordpress Levo-Slideshow 2.3 - Arbitrary File Up-
load Vulnerability
9 WPress 07/06 Config vulnerability An exploit is provided; a software correction is
suggested
Bugtraq: Oracle Orakill.exe Buffer Overflow 9 Oracle 14/06 Patch Buffer overflow A patch is available; an exploit is provided
#CISCO fixed severe #vulnerabilities in Network Management
and #Security Products #SecurityAffairs
9 Cisco 30/06
(2)
Patch vulnerabilities Patch for critical vulnerabilities (CVSS ≥ 8.6)
announced on Twitter before being published on
NVD
#ubuntu #security : USN-3016-1: Linux kernel vulnerabilities 8 Linux 27/06 Patch vulnerabilities Several vulnerabilities patched, some were not
yet included on NVD, half of the vulns with
CVSS ≥ 7.5
Microsoft Internet Explorer CVE-2016-3205 Scripting Engine
Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability Type: Vulnerabil
8 IE 14/06
(1)
Config vulnerability, remote This cluster contains various threats with CVSS
≥ 7.5; configurations are suggested to solve the
issue before it is patched
NA - CVE-2016-2825 - Mozilla Firefox before 47.0 allows re-
mote... Mozilla Firefox before 47.0 allows remote attack
8 Firefox 13/06 Patch attack, remote A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 6.5
#0daytoday #WordPress Social Stream Plugin 1.5.15 -
wp_options Overwrite Vulnerability [#0day #Exploit]
8 WPress 14/06 Patch exploit, vulnerability, 0day A patch is available; an exploit is provided
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 Garbage Collector Attribute
Type Confusion #exploit
8 IE 18/06 Patch exploit A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 8.8; an exploit is provided
CVE-2016-1388 Cisco Prime Network Analysis Module
(NAM) before 6.1(1) patch.6.1-2-final and 6.2.x before 6.2(1)
an
8 Cisco 03/06 Patch This cluster contains 4 threats, 3 with CVSS ≥
7.8; patches are available
#Oracle #Linux 6 : #openssl (ELSA-2016-0996) #Nessus 8 Linux 16/05 Patch This cluster contains seven threats: 3 critical
(CVSS 9.8) and 3 high (CVSS 7.5); patches are
available
Vuln: Linux Kernel Multiple Local Memory Corruption Vulner-
abilities
7 Linux 08/07 Patch vulnerabilities Patches are available for vulnerabilities with
CVSS 7.1 and 7.8
Vuln: Linux Kernel CVE-2016-0723 Local Race Condition Vul-
nerability
7 Linux 08/07 Patch vulnerability A patch is available for vulnerability with CVSS
6.8
Vuln: Linux kernel CVE-2013-7446 Use After Free Denial of
Service Vulnerability
7 Linux 05/07 Patch denial of service, vulnerability A patch is available for vulnerability with CVSS
5.3
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Firepower System
Software Static Credential Vulnerability
7 Cisco 29/06
(3)
Patch vulnerability A patch is available for vulnerability with CVSS
8.6
#0daytoday #WordPress Ultimate Membership Pro Plugin 3.3 -
SQL Injection Vulnerability [#0day #Exploit]
7 WPress 29/06 Patch SQL injection, exploit,
injection, vulnerability, 0day
A patch is available; an exploit is provided
#0daytoday #Google Chrome - GPU Process MailboxManager-
Impl Double-Read Vulnerability [#0day #Exploit]
7 Chrome 15/06 Patch exploit, vulnerability, 0day A patch is available; an exploit is provided
#0daytoday #WordPress Gravity Forms Plugin 1.8.19 - Arbi-
trary File Upload Exploit [#0day #Exploit]
7 WPress 17/06 None exploit, 0day An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
#0daytoday #WordPress Uncode Theme 1.3.1 - Arbitrary File
Upload Exploit [webapps #exploits #0day #Exploit]
7 WPress 06/06 N/A exploit, 0day All tweet links are broken; nothing can be in-
ferred
#0daytoday #WordPress Double Opt-In for Download Plugin
2.0.9 - SQL Injection Vulnerability [#0day #Exploit]
7 WPress 06/06 Patch SQL injection, exploit,
injection, vulnerability, 0day
A patch is available; an exploit is provided
#cybersecurity Hackers offering Microsoft Windows zero-day
exploit for $90000 #infosec
7 Windows 01/06 N/A exploit Just informative tweets
#Oracle ATS Arbitrary File Upload #PacketStorm 7 Oracle 24/05 None An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
Vuln: Linux Kernel ’usb/core/hub.c’ NULL Pointer Derefer-
ence Denial of Service Vulnerability
6 Linux 08/07 Patch denial of service, vulnerability A patch is available for vulnerability with CVSS
6.8
#0daytoday #Linux - ecryptfs and /proc/$pid/environ Privilege
Escalation Vulnerability [#0day #Exploit]
6 Linux 21/06
(6)
None exploit, escalation,
vulnerability, 0day
An exploit is early presented for a vulnerability
with CVSS 7.8; an expert might use this data for
protection
CVE-2016-3221 The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Win-
dows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Win-
dows
6 Windows 16/06 Patch A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 7.8
NA - CVE-2016-3201 - Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows
Server 2012 Gold... Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows Server
2012
6 Windows 16/06 Patch A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 6.5
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Table 8: Largest generated clusters represented as IoCs (cont.).
Cluster exemplar text (without links) # Asset Date Action Threat type Notes
#0daytoday #Joomla com_affiliatetracker - SQL Injection Vul-
nerability [webapps #exploits #Vulnerability #0day
6 Joomla 13/06 N/A SQL injection, exploit,
injection, vulnerability, 0day
All tweet links are broken; nothing can be in-
ferred
[shellcode] - #Linux x86_64 Shellcode Null-Free Reverse TCP
Shell #ExploitDB
6 Linux 16/06 None exploit An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
Bugtraq: [security bulletin] - Linux Kernel Flaw, ASN.1 DER
decoder for x509 certificate DER
6 Linux 06/06
(21)
Patch certificate A highly important Linux kernel flaw (CVSS
7.8) was disclosed 21 days before being in-
cluded in NVD
[webapps] - WordPress WP Mobile Detector Plugin 3.5 - Arbi-
trary File Upload: WordPress WP Mobile Detector Plu...
6 WPress 06/06 Patch A patch is available; an exploit is provided
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Prime Network Anal-
ysis Module IPv6 Denial of Service Vulnerability
6 Cisco 01/06
(1)
Patch denial of service, vulnerability A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 5.3
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Prime Network Anal-
ysis Module Unauthenticated Remote Code #bugtraq
6 Cisco 01/06
(1)
Patch remote A patch is available for a critical vulnerability
with CVSS 9.8
WordPress Patches Zero Day in WP Mobile Detector Plugin
#InfoSec
6 WPress 03/06 Patch zero day A patch is available
CVE-2016-1381 Memory leak in Cisco AsyncOS 8.5 through
9.0 before 9.0.1-162 on Web Security Appliance (WSA) device
6 Cisco 25/05 Patch leak A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 7.5
Oracle E-Business Suite Vulnerabilities Related To Common
Components Oracle E-Business Intelligence component in O
6 Oracle 23/05 None vulnerabilities The tweet links provide no useful information
NA - cisco-sa-20160518-wsa4 - Cisco Web Security Appliance
Connection Denial of Service Vulnerability A vulnerabil
6 Cisco 18/05
(6)
Patch denial of service, vulnerability A high impact vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) was dis-
closed and patched before its inclusion on NVD
#ubuntu #security : USN-2947-1: Linux kernel vulnerabilities 6 Linux 06/04 Patch vulnerabilities A patch is available to solve multiple vulnerabil-
ities, one of them critical (CVSS 9.8)
Vuln: Cisco Video Communication Server and Expressway
CVE-2016-1444 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
5 Cisco 08/07 Patch vulnerability A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 6.5
Vuln: Google Chrome Prior to 49.0.2623.75 Multiple Security
Vulnerabilities
5 Chrome 06/07 Patch vulnerabilities A patch is available to solve multiple high to crit-
ical vulnerabilities (5 with CVSS 8.8 and 5 with
CVSS 9.8)
[webapps] - WordPress Real3D FlipBook Plugin - Multiple Vul-
nerabilities: WordPress Real3D FlipBook Plugin - M...
5 WPress 04/07 None vulnerabilities An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
Vuln: Linux Kernel ’btrfs/inode.c’ Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability
5 Linux 05/07 Patch vulnerability A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 4.0
Medium - CVE-2016-5835 - WordPress before 4.5.3 allows re-
mote attackers... WordPress before 4.5.3 allows remote at
5 WPress 29/06 Patch attack, remote A patch is available for a vulnerability with
CVSS 7.5
#vulnerability #security : WordPress Contus Video Comments
1.0 File Upload
5 WPress 22/06 None vulnerability An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
[webapps] - WordPress Ultimate Product Catalog Plugin 3.8.1 -
Privilege Escalation: WordPress Ultimate Produc...
5 WPress 20/06 Patch escalation A patch is available; an exploit is provided
#0daytoday #WordPress Premium SEO Pack 1.9.1.3 -
wp_options Overwrite Exploit [webapps #exploits #0day
#Exploit]
5 WPress 21/06 None exploit, 0day An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
CVE-2016-0200 Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 through 11 al-
lows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause
5 IE 16/06 Patch attack, remote The cluster contains two different threats;
patches are available to solve 4 vulns with CVSS
8.8
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco RV110W, RV130W,
and RV215W Routers Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
5 Cisco 15/06
(3)
Patch vulnerability, execution A critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) was dis-
closed and patched before its inclusion on NVD
#0daytoday #WordPress Newspaper Theme 6.7.1 - Privilege Es-
calation Exploit [webapps #exploits #0day #Exploit]
5 WPress 06/06 Patch exploit, escalation, 0day A patch is available; an exploit is provided
[webapps] - WordPress Simple Backup Plugin 2.7.11 - Multiple
Vulnerabilities: WordPress Simple Backup Plugin ...
5 WPress 06/06 None vulnerabilities An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
CVE-2016-1701 The Autofill implementation in Google
Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 mishandles the interaction be-
tween
5 Chrome 06/06 Patch All tweets refer a different vulnerability, all
from the same date, all with CVSS ≥ 7.5;
patches are available
#0daytoday #WordPress WP PRO Advertising System Plugin
4.6.18 - SQL Injection Exploit [#0day #Exploit]
5 WPress 06/06 None SQL injection, exploit,
injection, 0day
An exploit is presented; an expert might use this
data for protection
[webapps] - WordPress Creative Multi-Purpose Theme 9.1.3 -
Stored XSS: WordPress Creative Multi-Purpose Theme...
5 WPress 06/06 Patch XSS A patch is available; an exploit is provided
#WordPress WP Mobile Detector 3.5 Shell Upload #Packet-
Storm
5 WPress 04/06 Patch A patch is available; an exploit is provided
#hackers Selling Unpatched Microsoft Windows Zero-Day Ex-
ploit for $90.000
5 Windows 03/06 N/A exploit Just informative tweets
Oracle E-Business Suite Vulnerabilities Related To E-Business
Intelligence Oracle E-Business Intelligence compon
5 Oracle 30/05 None vulnerabilities The tweet links provide no useful information
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Products IPv6 Neigh-
bor Discovery Crafted Packet Denial of Service
5 Cisco 25/05
(4)
Patch denial of service A high impact vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) was dis-
closed and patched before its inclusion on NVD
#ubuntu #security : USN-2975-2: Linux kernel (Trusty HWE)
vulnerability
5 Linux 16/05
(42)
Patch vulnerability A high impact vulnerability (CVSS 7.8) was dis-
closed and patched before its inclusion on NVD
(42 days in advance)
Bugtraq: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Web Security Appli-
ance HTTP POST Denial of Service Vulnerability
5 Cisco 18/05
(6)
Patch vulnerability A high impact vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) was dis-
closed and patched before its inclusion on NVD
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